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European Decision Could Have Killed 
Investment Treaties, Affecting Arbitration 
and Investments 
A broader interpretation of the Achmea decision implicates the autonomy 
of EU laws and could discourage investment among EU member states. 
By Peter "Bo" Rutledge, Katherine M. Larsen and Amanda W. Newton 
A dramatic upheaval in investor-state arbitration last year recently led to the apparent 
demise of investment treaties throughout Europe and could have broad implications for 
both international arbitration and foreign investments in the European Union. In May 
2018, the Court of Justice of the European Union found in Achmea v. Slovak Republic 
that the bilateral investment treaty between the Netherlands and the Slovak Republic (a 
so-called intra-EU BIT) contained an arbitration clause that was incompatible with 
European law.  
Interpreted narrowly, the Achmea decision was viewed by some as affecting only those 
other pre-existing intra-EU BITs that contain the same arbitration provision. A broader 
interpretation of the Achmea decision, on the other hand, implicates the autonomy of 
EU laws and could discourage investment among EU member states. 
With an eye toward the post-Achmea confusion regarding the arbitrability of intra-EU 
BITs, 21 EU member states filed a declaration in January 2019 that denounced all 
investor-state arbitration clauses and committed these member states to the 
termination of their intra-EU BITs. Citing Achmea, the member states pledged that no 
new intra-EU investment arbitration proceedings would be initiated and promised to 
request that courts set aside or choose not to enforce any award related to an intra-EU 
investment treaty.   
Arguably, the impact of Achmea should not come as a shock—in the past 15 years, the 
European Commission has grown increasingly disenchanted with investor-state 
arbitration proceedings, maintaining that they are incompatible with EU law because 
they allow disputes regarding the application of EU law to be decided by a court outside 
the EU’s judicial system. By this view, the Achmea decision is just one step of many in 
the EC’s continued opposition to intra-EU investor treaties, undermining the individual 
member states’ autonomy and pushing toward an EU controlled European Multilateral 
Investment Court System. 
However, arbitral tribunals before Achmea had ignored the EC’s opposition, finding 
they did have jurisdiction to decide questions of EU law. Thus, the Achmea decision 
marked a shift away from arbitral tribunals’ long-standing jurisprudence and toward the 
position staked by the EC.   
The Achmea decision stemmed from a 2008 dispute between the Slovak Republic and 
Achmea, a company based in the Netherlands. Pursuant to the BIT between the 
Netherlands and the Slovak Republic, Achmea commenced arbitration proceedings in 
Germany. A German tribunal found that Slovak Republic violated Achmea’s rights 
under the BIT, awarding Achmea approximately 22 million euros. The Slovak Republic 
filed a set-aside action in the German court, alleging that the arbitration clause in the 
BIT violated the European Union Treaty, which was referred to the CJEU.  
The CJEU held that the arbitration provision in the intra-EU BIT was incompatible with 
EU law because it called upon an arbitral tribunal to interpret or apply EU law 
governing the establishment and free movement of capital. This provision undermined 
the principle vesting such authority in the European courts and the courts of member 
states because review of the merits of the tribunal’s award would be minimal at best. 
Consequently, in the CJEU’s view, the BIT’s arbitration provision created an 
unsustainable risk that a decision-maker outside the European judicial system would, 
effectively, have the last word on the meaning of European law in an intra-European 
dispute. 
Although it is too early to determine the full reach of Achmea, the response in European 
courts has been mixed. In Republic of Poland v. PL Holdings S.á.r.l., for instance, the 
Svea Court of Appeal held that the arbitral award should not be set aside, as it did not 
violate a protective public interest. Soundly rejecting Achmea, the court held that the 
arbitral award did not implicate European law, so the arbitral tribunal had no reason to 
apply EU law. In Vattenfall v. Federal Republic of Germany, the tribunal limited the 
application of Achmea to investor-state disputes in bilateral intra-EU treaties, finding 
that Achmea did not govern multilateral treaties between EU member states and third 
parties. The tribunal also contended that the Energy Charter Treaty was an agreement 
between member states, third states, and the EU itself, meaning that it was not an intra-
EU agreement falling under the purview of Achmea. 
As the scope of Achmea is worked out, investment agreements between EU member 
states and non-EU countries may be affected. Just like intra-EU BITs, the arbitration 
tribunals established under such agreements are typically not within the EU judicial 
system and may involve disputes that require a tribunal to interpret or to apply EU law.  
In the United States, a broad interpretation of Achmea could also have vast 
ramifications. In 2017, the US invested an estimated $3.2 trillion in foreign direct 
investments in the EU, and the United States is party to nine BITs with EU member 
states. Currently, there are at least three known arbitrations between U.S. investors and 
European member states pursuant to such BITs. The scope of Achmea could affect the 
outcome of those matters, especially if the decision is broadly interpreted. Even if 
Achmea is read narrowly, Achmea might well undermine investor confidence in the 
stability of dispute resolution mechanisms within the EU. 
With more questions than answers at this point regarding the arbitrability of 
international BITs, the bar should watch carefully for the outcome of one upcoming 
federal case pending in the District of Columbia. In Novenergia v. Spain, a Swedish 
court refused to enforce an arbitration award for Novenergia on the grounds that the 
arbitration provision in the Energy Charter Treaty was incompatible with Achmea. 
Novenergia then filed suit in the D.C. District Court, seeking enforcement of the award 
(on the ground that the Swedish court’s annulment of the award does not obligate the 
U.S. court to refuse enforcement). The Novenergia case is still pending, but the 
upcoming decision should provide useful insight into how U.S. courts will respond to 
the post-Achmea chaos. 
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